The Star Entertainment losses now total more than A$735 million across two financial years. In August 2026, the company reported a A$307 million loss, and both its directors and auditors flagged serious doubt about whether the group can survive.
None of this arrived without warning. Looking back, there were at least three clear ones. This is what each warning said, and what happened next.
Warning one: the report that wasn’t acted on
An external KPMG report identified deficiencies in Star’s processes for managing money laundering risk. In March 2026, the Federal Court found that former CEO Matt Bekier breached his duties, including by failing to properly deal with that report (ASIC, 5 March 2026).
The warning existed on paper. It reached the top. The court found it wasn’t handled properly.
Warning two: the headlines about a rival
Media allegations about Crown and the junket operator Suncity put the whole industry on notice. The court found Bekier failed to properly manage the risks from Suncity’s operations in a private gaming room at The Star, even after becoming aware of those allegations. It also found that former Chief Legal and Risk Officer Paula Martin breached her duties. The court dismissed ASIC’s case against seven non-executive directors (ASIC, 5 March 2026).
Warning three: the licence
An independent inquiry into Star’s links with junket operators led to The Star Sydney’s casino licence being suspended in 2022 (IAG, March 2026). In September 2026, the suspension was reported to have been extended to June 2027. The property still runs under a regulator-appointed manager.
The bill: Star Entertainment losses in 2025 and 2026
Star reported a statutory net loss of A$427.9 million for FY25 and A$307.3 million for FY26 (ABC News, 31 August 2026). The FY26 accounts state that material uncertainties cast significant doubt on the group’s ability to continue as a going concern. AUSTRAC is separately seeking a A$400 million penalty over anti-money laundering failures, with the court’s decision still pending.
The 2026 statistic behind the pattern
In February 2026, Corporate Board Member published its What Directors Think 2026 report, based on more than 200 public company directors. 53% said they don’t often receive real-time data between meetings, which makes oversight a challenge. 47% said they want more frequent, structured risk discussions at full-board level instead of sitting through management presentations.
That’s the gap every warning at Star had to cross. The information existed. It just reached the board late, filtered, or not at all.
Star’s response
Star has new owners and new leadership. Bally’s Corporation and Investment Holdings took a controlling stake in late 2025. Group CEO Bruce Mathieson Jnr said the company has moved to a more accountable, property-led operating model with a renewed focus on performance, customers and responsible operations. Star says revenue stabilised in the June 2026 quarter and it expects to start building cash in FY27.
The MoodyBot probability model: what Star could have saved
MoodyBot, the AI layer inside Moody At Work, reads anonymous daily mood check-ins across teams and departments. It doesn’t review audit reports or monitor transactions. What it tracks is how people feel at work, every day, without their names attached.
All three warnings above came from outside: an auditor, the media, an inquiry. The people inside the business often sense a problem long before any of those. In a business like Star, the signals MoodyBot could have surfaced include pressure and discomfort in compliance, risk and VIP gaming teams, check-in reasons clustering around being told to look the other way or not being heard, and a gap between how those teams felt and how leadership felt.
That would have been a fourth warning: real-time, straight from Star’s own people, and available to the board between meetings.
| Risk | Publicly reported loss | Model assumptions | What MoodyBot could have saved |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net losses | A$427.9m (FY25) plus A$307.3m (FY26), total A$735.2m | 15% to 30% linked to culture and governance failures (trading conditions, debt and remediation also played a role); 20% to 40% chance early signals lead to action | A$22.1m to A$88.2m |
| AUSTRAC penalty | A$400m sought; decision pending | Not yet a loss | Not counted |
| Sydney licence | Suspended since 2022 | Revenue impact not separately disclosed | Not quantified |
| Going concern risk | Directors and auditors flag significant doubt | Not measurable in dollars | Not quantified |
| Total quantified | A$22.1m to A$88.2m |
How the numbers were built: A$735.2m x 15% x 20% gives A$22.1m. A$735.2m x 30% x 40% gives A$88.2m. The early action probability is kept low because these failures sat at executive level, where anonymous team data has less reach than it does on the front line.
What every board can take from Star
Three warnings came from outside the business. Each arrived later and cost more than the one before. The cheapest warning is always the one from your own people, and it only helps if it reaches the board while there’s still time to act.
Another KPMG report, another story about warnings: read about the KPMG Australia whistleblower scandal.
Frequently asked questions
How much has Star Entertainment lost? Star reported a statutory net loss of A$427.9 million in FY25 and A$307.3 million in FY26, a total of more than A$735 million.
What did the court find about Star’s former executives? In March 2026, the Federal Court found former CEO Matt Bekier and former Chief Legal and Risk Officer Paula Martin breached their duties. Claims against seven non-executive directors were dismissed.
Do boards get the information they need in time? According to Corporate Board Member’s What Directors Think 2026 report, 53% of directors say they don’t often receive real-time data between meetings.
Sources: Corporate Board Member, What Directors Think 2026 (10 February 2026); ASIC (5 March 2026); ABC News (31 August 2026); IAG (March and August 2026); PokerNews (September 2026).
All factual claims are sourced from publicly available reporting. The Star Entertainment Group’s representatives have stated that the company has moved to a more accountable, property-led operating model with a renewed focus on performance, customers and responsible operations. MoodyBot projections represent an independent illustrative probability model based on publicly reported information and are not guaranteed outcomes.